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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the eects of the anticipation of regret on decision making
under uncertainty. Regret is a negative, cognitively based emotion that we experi-
ence when realizing or imagining that our present situation would have been
better, had we decided dierently. The experience of post-decisional regret is
for a large part conditional on the knowledge of the outcomes of the rejected
alternatives. A series of studies is reviewed in which it is shown that whether or
not decision makers expect post-decisional feedback on rejected alternatives has
a profound in¯uence on the decisions they make. These studies, focusing on
choice between gambles, consumer decision making and interpersonal decision
making, also show that anticipated regret can promote risk-averse as well as risk-
seeking choices. This review of empirical studies is followed by a discussion of the
conditions under which we can expect the anticipation of regret to take place.
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The Dutch postal code lottery owes its name to the process by which the winner is selected. The
winning numbers are randomly drawn postal codes. There are a variety of prizes to be won in this
lottery. For example, for the Street Prize a postal code is drawn and everyone who bought a ticket and
has this postal code receives a `relatively' small prize (between approximately $2000 and $20,000). By
chance one of the ticket holders in that postal code areawins a larger prize. Also the Grand Prize in this
lottery, which can be as large as 18,700,000 Dutch Guilders (grant prize January 1998, approximately
$9,350,000), is selected on the basis of a postal code. The lottery ticket only costs 10 Guilders. If you
are an inhabitant of the Netherlands should you decide to buy a ticket or not?
Before answering this question you might want to consider the following situation. Imagine that
your postal code has been selected, but you did not buy a ticket. However, your neighbor, with whom
you share your postal code, did buy a ticket and won the 18,700,000 Dutch Guilders. How would
you feel? Probably you would kick yourself and think repeatedly `if only I had bought a ticket ...',
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Contract grant number: ERBFMBICT961052.followed by bitter thoughts of all the ways in which your life could have been better. This unpleasant
experience can be described as regret. Regret is a negative, cognitively based emotion that we
experience when realizing or imagining that our present situation would have been better, had we
decided dierently. If you consider the possibility of regret before making your decision whether or not
to play in the postal code lottery, it might prompt you to buy a ticket, because buying a ticket protects
you against the possibility of severe regret. Thus, anticipating future regret may in¯uence current
decisions with uncertain outcomes. The organizers of the postal code lottery know the power of regret.
In their advertisements, trying to persuade people to play this lottery, they state: `Don't you have any
tickets? Then your neighbors will win everything. So make sure that you buy some now.'
What makes the postal code lottery dierent from other lotteries is that, in fact, everybody already
has a ticket (i.e. your postal code). The decision to make is whether or not to validate your ticket. The
consequence of the structure of this lottery is that you will always learn the outcome of both options,
playing the lottery versus not playing the lottery. In other lotteries you only learn the outcome of
playing the lottery when you decide to do so.
1 The eects of this expected feedback on the anticipation
of regret, and on decision making is the focus of this paper. More speci®cally, I will brie¯y describe
theories and research that address the role of regret in decision making. Next I will review our own
research program that was aimed at investigating the eects of anticipated regret, via manipulations of
expected feedback, in various decision contexts. I will end with a discussion of other possible
antecedent conditions under which regret will be anticipated.
REGRET THEORY
The idea that people might take into account emotional reactions to possible outcomes when making
decisions has some history in research on decision making. For instance, the psychologists Janis and
Mann (1977) focused more on the psychological aspects of anticipated regret. They expressed elegantly
how decision makers fear for future regret in¯uences their behavior. Janis and Mann maintain that the
anticipation of regret induces us to make more `rational' choices; that is, anticipated regret causes
people to think more elaborately before making a ®nal decision. They state that (p.222):
Before undertaking any enterprise `of great pith and moment,' we usually delay action and think
about what might happen that could cause regret ... Anticipatory regret is a convenient generic
term to refer to the main psychological eects of the various worries that beset a decision maker
before any losses actually materialize ... Such worries, which include anticipatory guilt and
shame, provoke hesitation and doubt, making salient the realization that even the most attractive
of the available choices might turn out badly.
Earlier, in the 1950s, researchers had already pursued a more formal approach to regret (e.g. Luce
and Raia, 1957; Savage, 1951). These researchers argued that we sometimes base our decisions on a
`minimax regret' principle. This principle holds that one computes the maximum of possible regret for
each option, and then chooses the option where this maximum regret is smallest. Regret in this sense is
de®ned as the dierence between the actual outcome of the chosen option and the highest possible
1 Unless, of course, the lottery allows you to pick the numbers yourself, and you know which numbers you would have chosen
had you played the lottery. Because of their propensity of regret these lotteries, and the Dutch postal code lottery, can have
dramatic consequences as is illustrated by the following event. In April 1995 an inhabitant of Liverpool, UK (aged 51) took his
own life after missing out on a £2 million prize in the National Lottery. He did so after discovering that that week's winning
combination were the numbers he always selected, 14, 17, 22, 24, 42 and 47. On this occasion, however, he had forgotten to
renew his ®ve-week ticket on time. It had expired the previous Saturday.
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2 The minimax regret rule is useful when there is no knowledge
whatsoever about the probabilities of the possible outcomes, because this rule does not take prob-
abilities into account. However, if there is knowledge about these probabilities, the minimax regret
principle is suboptimal. In such cases a very unprobable negative outcome may have too large an
in¯uence on the decision to be made. Such an outcome can make an option very unattractive, because
the possible regret associated with that option is very big, even though the occurrence of the regret is
highly unprobable.
More recently, the economists Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) formulated decision
theories that also take the probability of regret into account. Their Regret Theory is a modi®ed version
of standard Expected Utility (EU) theory. Both regret theory and EU theory assume that the expected
utility of an option depends on the calculus of pain and pleasure associated with the outcomes of that
option. Regret theory diers from EU theory in that the expected utility of an option additionally
depends on the regret that one may experience by comparing the outcomes of that option to the
outcomes of a rejected option. People experience regret when the outcome of the rejected option would
have been better, and rejoicing when the outcome of the rejected option would have been worse. For
example, Exhibit 1 depicts a choice between two options, A and B, where the outcome depends on
which ball is picked from an urn. If a decision maker opts for A and a red ball is picked, he or she
experiences the utility of the $100, and an additional amount of utility (rejoicing) due to the knowledge
that choosing B would have produced $0. On the other hand, the same gain of $100 after opting for B
(when Yellow is picked) results in less utility since the utility of $100 is adjusted for the regret that one
did not choose A, and therefore missed the $200.
Although regret and rejoicing are only felt after the outcomes of the decision are known, the idea is
that these emotions are anticipated and taken into account when evaluating the dierent options.
Thus, in the example above the decision maker must come to terms with the fact that either choice will
leave him or her open to the possibility of regret. The decision maker must balance the fact that regret
will be felt in B if either Blue or Yellow is picked, against the more intense regret that would be felt in A
if Red was picked. Taken together, regret theory assumes that the tendencies to avoid negative
emotions like regret and to strive for positive emotions like rejoicing are important determinants of
human decision making.
How well does regret theory describe decision making? In principle regret theory can explain many
of the deviations from utility theory (e.g. the common ratio eect, preference intransitivities).
Empirical tests have produced results in line with the theory (e.g. Loomes, Starmer and Sugden, 1991,
Exhibit 1. Outcomes for choice options A and B for the dierent states of the world
Options
States of the world
Red (33.3%) Yellow (33.3%) Blue (33.3%)
A $100 $200 $0
B $0 $100 $200
Note: This exhibit displays a choice between options A and B. The outcome of both options
depends on the color of the ball that is randomly picked from an urn. All three colors have an
equal chance of being picked.
2 In the original minimax regret rule only comparisons between the obtained outcome and better foregone outcomes are
included. When the foregone outcome is worse than the obtained outcome, the regret is ®xed on zero. Recently Acker (1997)
suggested an approach of tempered regrets, in which the zero regrets are replaced by a score representing the rejoicing felt when
the obtained outcome is better than the foregone outcome. Acker argues that the tempered regret rule describes the decision
process under total ignorance better than the minimax regret rule. Regret theory, described later in this article, also takes into
account the possible rejoicing.
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position eects, that is, demonstrations that preferences are in¯uenced by how the states of the world
match up, or in other words, by the juxtaposition of the consequences of the possible actions. Recently
it has been suggested that these eects might not be caused by the juxtaposition of the outcomes, but
rather by event splitting, increased weighting of consequences when they are split into two subevents
than when it is considered as a single event (see, for details, Starmer and Sugden, 1993). Also other
research aimed at directly testing predictions from regret theory did not provide unequivocal support
(see Harless, 1992; Di Cagnio and Hey, 1988; Kelsey and Schepanski, 1991; Leland, 1998).
Despite the mixed success of regret theory, there is some support for the broader claim underlying
the theory, that people take regret into account when making decisions. This support comes from
studiesthat focus on the salience of post-decisional regret when making decisions, and on the role of the
expectation of feedback on the outcome of unchosen options. This is the research to which I turn next.
EVIDENCE THAT ANTICIPATED REGRET INFLUENCES BEHAVIORAL
DECISION MAKING
Manipulations of regret salience




would feel after having made the wrong decision. This question made them more likely to purchase an
item that would shield them from possible regret (i.e. a higher-priced, well-known brand) over a
potentiallybetter,butmoreriskyitem(alessexpensive,lesser-knownbrand).Inarelatedstudy,Richard
et al. (1996) showed that respondents who were asked to anticipate the regret and related emotions they
would experience after engaging in unsafe sex reported less risky sexual behavior in the ®ve months
following the study than a group of control respondents. And ®nally, Parker, Stradling and Manstead
(1996) tested four videos developed as an intervention to prevent people from committing driving
violations. One of these videos focused drivers on the regret they might experience after exceeding the
speed limit. This video brought about signi®cant changes in beliefs and attitudes about unsafe driving.
The research described above seems to suggest, in line with the saying that you should `better be safe
than sorry', that regret results in risk aversion. And some theorists also explicitly state this. Kardes
(1994), for example, argued that `Concern about regret that may follow a bad decision promotes
extreme risk-aversion' (p.448). However, the research to which I turn now focuses on the eects of
expectations of post-decisional feedback, and shows that anticipated regret may also result in risk-
seeking tendencies.
Manipulations of expected feedback
Since regret and rejoicing stem from comparisons of obtained decision outcomes with forgone decision
outcomes, feedback is a central issue in regret theory. An important assumption in regret theory is
therefore that both the chosen and the unchosen option(s) will be resolved. If there is no explicit
feedbackon forgone outcomes, adecisionmakercannot comparewhat iswith what would have been.
3In
3 Research on counterfactual thinking (e.g. Roese, 1997; Zeelenberg et al., 1998b, d) shows that people may also mentally
construe feedback and compare the obtained outcome to this construed alternative. In general I assume that the regret stemming
from comparisons with these construed alternatives is less painful than the regret stemming from comparisons with real forgone
alternatives. The results of Bar-Hillel and Neter (1996) may suggest, however, that in some cases regret stemming from
counterfactual thinking can be of equal strength.
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no feedback on what would have been there is no need to anticipate future regret. In recent years a
number of studies have shown that feedback indeed in¯uences experienced regret or satisfaction with
decision outcomes (e.g. Boles and Messick, 1995; Inman, Dyer and Jia, 1997; Ritov and Baron, 1995;
Taylor, 1997).
In real-life decisions people may occasionally receive information about forgone outcomes. For
example, people choosing to invest in particular stocks will learn about future stock prices for the
chosen stocks, but also for the non-chosen stocks. Likewise, gamblers who decide not to bet on the
long shot in a horse race will learn after the race is over the position at which this horse ®nished, and
thus whether this option would have been better. For some quite important life decisions, however,
such feedback is often not present. If you decide to go in business with someone or to marry someone
(else), you will never ®nd out how successful each enterprise would have been had you chosen another
partner or spouse, or none at all. In these cases there is only feedback on the chosen option.
How might this feedback in¯uence our decisions? An important assumption to be made is that
people are regret-averse. This means that people consider the experience of regret to be unpleasant
and that they tend to make so-called regret-minimizing choices. In many of the past studies regret-
minimizing choices were risk-averse choices. Take, for example, the often-used choice between a
gamble and a sure thing. If you opt for the sure thing you normally do not learn whether the gamble
would have been better. If you opt for the gamble you will always learn the outcome of the gamble and
the outcome of the sure thing, thus you will always know whether the sure thing would have been
better. Thus the sure thing protects you from regret, whereas the gamble carries some risk of regret. If
you in this case anticipate regret you will opt for the sure thing, revealing risk-aversion.
In real life there may also be situations in which the risky option is the regret-minimizing option.
These are situations in which there is a choice between two options, one being more risky than the
other, and in which there will always be feedback on the outcome of the riskier option, while the safer
option will only be resolved if chosen. When opting for the safer choice, you run the risk of learning
that the riskier option turned out to be better, and thus suer regret. As argued above, the possibility
of post-decisional regret can make people decide to buy a lottery ticket in the postal code lottery.
Buying a lottery ticket is risky compared to not buying the ticket, because the latter choice provides
you with a sure outcome whereas the ®rst provides you with an uncertain outcome. For another
example, imagine that you are considering which second-hand car to buy: the reliable, but more
expensive Saab (safer option), or the cheaper Renault which has a history of mechanical problems
(riskier option). These are the only two cars that ®t your requirements. You are leaning towards the
Saab when your friend Nathalie, who joined you, says that if you don't buy the Renault she will.
However, Nathalie is not interested in the Saab. Suddenly you worry that you will spend all this extra
money on the Saab and then perhaps ®nd out that Nathalie never has any problems with the Renault,
and you will regret wasting your money. You realize that if you buy the Renault you will never
know what will happen to the Saab (the safer option). Thus the Renault, the riskier option, also turns
out to be the regret-minimizing option. Thus, in this case anticipated regret pushes you toward risk-
seeking.
Larrick and Boles (1995) and Ritov (1996) have provided empirical evidence showing relatively risk-
seeking behavior as a consequence of anticipated regret. In the Larrick and Boles experiment part-
icipants negotiated about a signing bonusthey could earn when deciding towork foracertain company
ALPHA.Participantseitherexpectedtolearnorexpectednottolearntheoerofacompetingcompany
BETA after they reached an agreement with ALPHA. Participants who expected to learn the oer of
BETA (Feedback condition), could regret or rejoice about their decision to accept the bonus oered by
ALPHA.Theseparticipantswerelessrisk-averse,wantedtohaveahigherbonusandwereconsequently
less likely to reach agreement, than those who did not expect to learn the oer of BETA (No Feedback
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expected feedback. She also found increased risk-seeking as a consequence of anticipated regret.
BETTER SAFE THAN SORRY VERSUS BETTER RISKY THAN REGRETFUL
Plainly, evidence exists for both risk-avoiding and risk-seeking tendencies as a consequence of
the anticipation of regret. In recent studies we have examined when risk-aversion and when risk-seeking
were to occur (Inman and Zeelenberg, 1998; Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Zeelenberg and Beattie, 1997).
These studies also tested the robustness and generalizibility of regret eects in dierent decision
contexts. To this research I turn next.
Anticipated regret in a choice between gambles task
The hypothesis of interest in the research described in this section is that anticipated regret can result in
risk-averse and risk-seeking choices depending on which of the two is the regret-minimizing option.
The design of the ®rst series of experiments to test this prediction was as follows (Zeelenberg et al.,
1996): Participants were given a choice between two gambles, one being relatively risky and the other
being relatively safe. A matching procedure (cf. Slovic, 1975) ensured that these gambles were roughly
of equal attractiveness. This was done in the following manner. Participants always knew the outcome
of the riskier gamble and the probability of winning it. For example, in our Experiment 1 the riskier
gamble would result in a gain of 130 Dutch Guilders with a probability of 35%, or in no gain with a
probability of 65%. In the safer gamble they could gain an unknown amount X with a probability
of 65%, or no gain with a probability of 35%. It was the participants' task to write down the value of
X for which they found the gambles equally attractive.
4
Next, feedback on one of the gambles was manipulated orthogonally to the riskiness of the gamble.
In all three experiments we had a Feedback Safer Gamble condition, in which the safer gamble would
always be resolved, and a Feedback Riskier Gamble condition, in which the riskier gamble would
always be resolved. In addition to this feedback all participants always expected to learn the outcome
of the chosen gamble. Participants in the Feedback Safer Gamble condition were predicted to choose
the safer gamble. The safer gamble would provide them with feedback on the chosen gamble only, and
protect them from threatening feedback on the riskier gamble. Likewise, participants in the Feedback
Riskier Gamble condition, who would always learn the outcome of the riskier gamble, were predicted
to opt for the riskier gamble. Exhibit 2 depicts the results. This pattern was found in all three studies, in
both high and low variance gambles, and in gambles involving both gains and losses. This research
thus demonstrates that the anticipation of regret can promote risk-averse but also risk-seeking
tendencies, depending on which of the two is regret-minimizing.
One of the studies reported in Zeelenberg et al. (1996) provided additional information that con-
®rmed the role of regret in these studies. Participants in this study were asked for justi®cations of their
choices. Participants in the two feedback conditions reported signi®cantly more regret related justi®-
cations than participants in a control condition did, where no feedback would be provided.
There may be some limitations to the research just described. First, a choice between matched
gambles paradigm was used. Because participants made the gambles equally attractive, they would
be more or less indierent when choosing between the two. The expectation of feedback pushed
4 Research by Tversky, Sattah and Slovic (1988) showed that decision makers are not necessarily indierent between alternatives
that are matched in attractiveness. For the present experiment it was sucient that there was no strong a-priori preference for
either of the alternatives.
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gamble. One might argue that the in¯uence of regret on decision-making is exaggerated in such a
paradigm, because of the initial indierence between the two gambles. A second possible limitation is
that the standard, context-free, gamble paradigm was used. Although this paradigm allows one to
study the regret eects in its purest form, some researchers have pleaded to move away from the
gamble, on to richer contexts, because the gamble paradigm might have limited generality.
Recently we presented research that replicated and extended our earlier ®ndings, and might help
to overcome their possible limitations (Inman and Zeelenberg, 1998; Zeelenberg and Beattie, 1997).
In these studies we focused on consumer decisions under uncertainty, and on decision making in
an interpersonal context. In all experiments possible feedback on forgone alternatives was manipulated
and the focus was on how this in¯uenced behavioral choice. This research is described below.
Anticipated regret in consumer decision making
This experiment tested whether the manipulation of feedback can in¯uence decision making in
situations that bear more resemblance to the decisions we encounter in our daily life, and where the
options were not matched on attractiveness (see, for details, Inman and Zeelenberg, 1998, Experiment
3). More speci®cally we studied the role of anticipated regret in three dierent consumer decisions.
These were a decision about a long-distance telephone service, the purchase of a personal computer,
and the choice of an apartment to live in during the last year in college. Participants were confronted
with the scenarios that described a choice between two options (again one being more risky than the
other). The expectation of post-decisional feedback was manipulated so that there could be feedback
on the riskier option, on the safer option, or no feedback at all. For example, in the long-distance
telephone service scenario there was a choice between two companies, the dominant ABC (safer
option), or the newer and smaller DDE (riskier option). In the Feedback Riskier [Safer] Option
condition participants read that the service of DDE [ABC] would be reviewed in the next issue of a
local magazine. In the No Feedback condition such information would not be present. As the results in
Exhibit 3 show, compared to the No Feedback condition, participants in the Feedback Riskier Option
condition demonstrate an increased preference for the risky option and participants in the Feedback
Safer Option condition demonstrate an increased preference for the safer option.
Note, though, that the preponderance of participants in the Inman and Zeelenberg (1998) experi-
ment remain risk-averse in all conditions, which may lead one to conclude that anticipated regret may
in¯uence preferences but may not really cause a preference for risk-seeking in an absolute sense.
However, in a similar experiment we found such a cross-over in risk attitude (see Zeelenberg and
Beattie, 1997, Experiment 1). This study had two feedback conditions in which participants stated their
willingness to invest in two ®nancial investment options. Participants's preference in the No Feedback
condition was risk-averse and in the Feedback Riskier Option it was risk-seeking.
Exhibit 2. Percentage of participants choosing the safer or riskier gamble as a
function of condition
Condition Choice
Riskier gamble Safer gamble
Feedback riskier gamble 60% 40%
Feedback safer gamble 30% 70%
Note: Data are taken from Zeelenberg et al. (1996), collapsed over all experiments.
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stated their willingness to invest) about options they could encounter in their own lives, instead of using
the traditional gamble paradigm. Also, these options were not matched on attractiveness, as was the
case in the research reported earlier. These ®ndings thus corroborate and extend the ®ndings described
earlier.
Anticipated regret in interpersonal decision making: the ultimatum game
Another extension of the earlier ®ndings was reported in Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997, Experiments 2a
and 2b). Whereas most former experiments studied purely individual decision making, Zeelenberg and
Beattie studied decisions that were made in an interpersonal context, namely in an ultimatum
bargaining situation.
The ultimatum game is played by the following simple procedure. Two players are allotted a sum of
money, e.g. $10. Player 1 (often called the Proposer) oers some portion of the money (e.g. $4) to
player 2 (the Responder). If the responderaccepts, she gets the $4, and the Proposer gets the rest ($6). If
the responder rejects the oer, both players get nothing. The predictions from economic theory are
straightforward. Responders should accept any amount of money, e.g. one cent, since this is more than
they would get by rejecting the oer. Proposers know this and should thus oer responders only the
one cent. Earlier research using this game, however, showed that people hardly ever oer the other
player only one cent. Moreover, if they do so, the other players refuse the oer. Commonly the average
oers are in the regions of 30±40%, with a 50±50 split often as the mode. Oers of less then 20% are
frequently rejected (see Camerer and Thaler, 1995).
How might anticipated regret in¯uence the behavior of proposers? Proposers can regret two things,
oering too little money when the oer is rejected and oering too much when the oer is accepted. If
we consider the fact that the modal oer is 50%, and that oers over 20% are almost always accepted,
there is more chance of regretting oers that are too high. There are two reasons why regret about
oering too much money is generally less severe than regret about oering too little money. First, when
a proposer regrets oering too much, she still has money, whereas when a proposer regrets oering too
little, she does not get any money at all. Second, the regret a proposer could feel when the oer is too
high is less severe, because she does not know exactly what the responder's minimal acceptable oer
was. Thus, normally the regret-minimizing option is oering too much. Although proposers know that
their oer was probably too high, they do not know to what extent, and therefore the regret will not be
that painful. But if the responder's minimal acceptable oer is communicated to the proposers, they
might learn that a much lower oer would also have been accepted. Feedback of this kind can make
regret about an oer that is too high more severe. Proposers who expect this feedback might anticipate
the possible regret, and move away from the 50±50 split.
Exhibit 3. Percentage of participants deciding for the safer or riskier option as a
function of condition
Condition Decision
Riskier option Safer option
Feedback riskier option 37% 63%
No feedback 21% 79%
Feedback safer option 11% 89%
Note: These are combined data from three scenarios from Inman and Zeelenberg (1998).
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minimal acceptable oer after they made their oer. The expectation was that proposers who expect
feedback on the minimal acceptable oer would make lower oers than proposers who do not expect
this feedback. This is because lowering theiroers does lower the amount of possible regret, asthe oer
will be closer to the minimal acceptable oers. At the same time lowering their oers does not need to
result in a higher likelihood of the oer being rejected, since oers will only be rejected if lower than
20%.
We had students playing the ultimatum game. They were told that half of them were randomly
selected to be proposer and the other half to be responder. In reality all of them were proposers. They
were told that they had to divide an amount of 100 Dutch Guilders between themselves and the
responder. Participants in the Feedback condition were told that they would always learn the
respondent's minimal acceptable oer, and that they would thus learn the exact amount of money that
they should have oered more to get their oer accepted or could have oered less and have their oer
still accepted. The depended variable was simply the oer made. As expected, participants in the
Feedback condition oered signi®cantly less money to the responder (M  36 Guilders) then did the
participants in the No Feedback condition (M  43 Guilders).
The results of this experiment clearly indicate that the expectation of feedback, a possible cause
of regret, in¯uences people's choices in the ultimatum game. When deciding how much to oer the
responder, participants who expected feedback on the responder's minimal acceptable oer made
lower oers than participants who did not expect to receive this feedback. This behavior re¯ects regret
aversion because lower oers result in less regret if accepted. The oers were, in general, not so low that
they would be rejected, which suggests that participants minimized both the regret that could arise
from oering too much and the regret that could arise from oering too little.
This ®nding thus extends the previous ®ndings reported in the present paper because it shows that
the motive of minimizing regret can also in¯uence decision making in interpersonal contexts. It thereby
also replicates the ®ndings from Larrick and Boles (1995) in a dierent negotiation context.
Discussion
Taken together, the research described above shows that the anticipation of regret caused by the
manipulation of expected feedback on forgone options in¯uences decisions in several contexts. Sub-
stantial eects were found for decisions involving matched gambles, in a consumer decision making
context, and in interpersonal decision making. These ®ndings and those reported in other recent
publications (Josephs et al., 1992; Larrick and Boles, 1995; Ritov, 1996; Ritov and Baron, 1995) clearly
show that people are motivated to make choices that shield them from threatening feedback on forgone
courses of action. Thus, people are motivated to avoid post-decisional regret. This regret aversion has a
profound in¯uence on their decisions, because the possibility of regret is anticipated, and subsequently
taken into account when making decisions. As a result people can become risk-averse or risk-seeking,
depending on which of the possible choice options is the regret-minimizing option.
WHEN DO WE ANTICIPATE REGRET?
Now that we have established that anticipation of regret in¯uences decision making, and that this seems
to be a robust ®nding, a necessary next step in this ®eld is to study the conditions under which people
anticipateregret. The research described in this paper showsthatthis islikely to be the casewhen people
expect to learn the outcome of the rejected alternative, but there may be other determinants as well.
Below I discuss ®ve conditionsthat might determine when regret is anticipated and how substantial this
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Mann, 1977, p.223), to my knowledge there has not yet been any attempt to empirically validate them.
1. The most preferred alternative is not necessarily superior to another alternative. The idea is that
when there is one dominant alternative the decision maker does not spend much time thinking about
the possible drawbacks of this alternative, because there is less self-recrimination when the obvious
superior alternative results in a suboptimal outcome. There was no reason for the decision maker to
have chosen another option; thus a bad outcome is not easily interpreted as indicative of a bad
decision. When there are more alternatives or behavioral options of roughly equal attractiveness,
peoplewill worry more about the consequences. When deciding between the options, they will compare
them more thoroughly and they will anticipate the regret they might feel when a rejected option proves
to be better than the chosen one. In these cases a bad outcome can easily be interpreted as a signal that
the wrong choice was made. This suggests that the more dicult a decision is, the more likely it is that
people take regret into account when deciding (cf. Sugden, 1985).
At this point it is important to note that there are several ways in which a decision can be dicult.
First, a decision may be dicult because the options are close in attractiveness (i.e. expected utility), as
is implied above. Second, a decision may be dicult because there is no explicit knowledge of the
probabilities and outcomes of each option.
5 A third reason why a decision may be dicult is because it
implies a trade-o between two important attributes, for example the safety of a automobile and its
cost (Beattie, 1988). I expect that for these ®rst three sources of decision diculty the hypothesized
relation holds (i.e. the more dicult, the more regret is anticipated). However, decisions may also be
dicult for a fourth reason, namely when the options themselves are dicult to compare (Bettman
and Sujan, 1987; Johnson, 1984). Here the relation between diculty and anticipated regret may be
dierent. Regret is an emotion that stems from the comparison of outcomes. It may be the case that
when outcomes are not easily compared, feelings of regret are not likely to occur. Therefore I expect
that this particular sort of decision diculty will not promote the anticipation of regret (or at least not
to the same extent as the others).
2. The negative consequences that might ensue from the decision could start to materialize almost
immediately after the decision is made. When the outcomes of the decision are not realized quickly, or
when they are not known within a short time span, decision makers might discount the possible regret
that this decision can cause. This can be related to research on intertemporal choice showing that
decision makers have a tendency to discount outcomes that are distant in time and base their decisions
on outcomes that are more proximal (e.g. Loewenstein, 1992; Roelofsma, 1996). In the research by
Richard et al. (1996) referred to earlier, the time of occurrence of the outcomes was not manipulated,
but their regret manipulation made the consequences of future outcomes more salient. The results of
Richard et al. show that people do not take into account the more long-term risks related to unsafe sex,
but they do take relatively immediate post-decisional aective reactions into account when these are
made salient to them (see also Simonson, 1992, and Parker et al., 1996).
3. Signi®cant persons in the decision maker's social network view the decision as important and will
expect him or her to adhere to it. Although Janis and Mann (1977) refer to the speci®cally social aspect
of the anticipation of regret (social factors have been neglected in empirical research on anticipated
regret so far), I argue that the same holds for more individualistic contexts. Implicit in the statement
above are two factors that promote anticipatory regret. The ®rst isthat the more important an outcome
5 Interestingly, this might imply that examples of how anticipated regret in¯uences decisions are easier to ®nd in real life than in
most experimental research. In experiments the choices are often between two options where probabilities and outcomes are
provided (e.g. gambles where the outcome depends on the number of dierent colors of balls in an urn). These features might
reduce the diculty of the choice problem (cf. Sugden, 1985), and therefore reduce the extent to which regret is anticipated.
Alternatively, one might argue that the choices in a laboratory experiment are often presented in such a way that the comparison
of outcomes per state of the world is facilitated, which would promote the anticipation of regret (cf. Harless, 1992).
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important decisions will result in more intense regret when things go awry. This would be the case
when the outcomes are important socially, as suggested by Janis and Mann, but probably also when
outcomes are `objectively' more important (e.g. when the stakes are higher).
The second factor towhich Janis and Mann point isthat other people might force the decision maker
tosticktothedecisioninitiallymade.Thisideaisrelatedtotheirreversibilityofdecisionsandoutcomes.
I predict that regret would be especially painful when a decision is irreversible. When the possibility of
reversing your decision exists, the regret caused by positive feedbackon the unchosen option will be less
painful. In these situations feedback can provide valuable information about how to improve your
current position. This is consistent with research by McAllister, Mitchel and Beach (1979) showing that
irreversibility results in more elaborated decision processes. Thus, when for some reason a decision has
outcomes that are not easy to undo, decision makers are more likely to anticipate regret. This will
probably hold for decisions that are irreversible, and for decisions that are in principle reversible, but in
practice dicult to reverse because of social forces.
4. New information concerning potential gains and losses can be obtained. As this paper has shown,
post-decisional feedback is a central determinant of experienced and anticipated regret. When this
feedback is present people anticipate possible regrets, but when it is absent regret does not play a
signi®cant role in the decision process. In the present paper I assumed that feedback about the chosen
option would always be present, and focused on feedback about the outcome of the unchosen options.
Janis and Mann (1977) suggest that feedback on the chosen option can also play a role. This relates
regret to post-decisional dissonance
6 (Festinger, 1957, 1964). Although the concepts of regret and post-
decisional dissonance obviously have a lot in common, future research is needed in order to clarify the
dierences more exactly. Probably the main dierence lies in the fact that regret is related to the feeling
that arises from comparing outcomes of the chosen and rejected alternatives, whereas dissonance can
also stem from thoughts and feelings concerning the chosen option only. This makes dissonance a
broader concept than regret. It might even be the case that regret is a particular sort of dissonance.
5. Signi®cant persons in the decision maker's social network who are interested in this particular
decision are not impatient about his current state of indecision and expect him to delay action until he has
evaluated the alternatives more carefully. Beattie et al. (1994) gathered empirical evidence that antici-
pated regret promotes decision aversion; e.g. the tendency to delay or avoid decisions (see also Thaler,
1980). Their research showed that decision aversion is an intrinsic motivation that might be promoted
by the anticipation of regret. It is interesting to note that there are several reasons why anticipated
regret and decision delay may be related. The delay may stem from a wish to gather more information
in order to come to a better decision. But it may also result because the decision maker wants to avoid
the negative consequences of the decision, or the responsibility for these consequences. Janis and Mann
suggest that this tendency to delay or avoid decisions will be especially strong when people who are
important to the decision maker stimulate careful consideration and delay.
In sum, these ®ve factors that suggest when people anticipate regret or not are worthy of further
investigation. An understanding of these factors and possible other factors might help us to specify
the boundary conditions under which decisions are in¯uenced by the anticipation of regret, and to
formulate a psychological theory about regret aversion. I consider this to be a necessary next step in the
research on anticipated regret.
6 Landman (1993, p.40) called regret `the be Ã te noir for the theory of cognitive dissonance', because it represents the opposite of
dissonance reduction. Nevertheless, cognitive dissonance theorists also studied regret (e.g. Festinger, 1964; Wicklund and
Brehm, 1976). It needs to be noted that their conceptualization of regret diers from the one in current regret research. In
cognitive dissonance research regret is typically operationalized as the reversal of the initial decision. Although I agree that this
sort of undoing is indicative of regret, present regret research views it as a consequence of regret and shows that regret is more
than just that (e.g. Gilovich and Medvec, 1995; Zeelenberg et al., 1998 a, c).
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In this paper I reviewed evidence concerning the role of anticipated regret in behavioral decision
making. Although ideas about regret were long present in this ®eld, only since the development of
regret theory, in the early 1980s, did researchers start to empirically address issues related to the
anticipation of regret. At present the support for regret theory seems to be mixed. There is, however,
ample support for the most important idea on which the theory is based, namely that anticipated regret
might in¯uence the decision we make. This support comes from studies in which post-decisional regret
is made salient to the decision maker at the time he or she makes the decision, and from studies in
which the expectation of post-decisional feedback in unchosen alternatives is manipulated. Our own
studies focused on these eects of feedback and showed eects in several domains. The results of our
studies show that the anticipation of regret can result in risk-avoiding as well as risk-seeking tendencies.
The article ended with a discussion of additional antecedent conditions under which the anticipation of
regret is hypothesized to take place. This may be a fruitful direction for future research.
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